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Going	“full-circle”	in	Somalia
As	the	countdown	to	the	withdrawal	of	the	Africa	Union’s	peacekeeping	force	in	Somalia	continues,	Bryan	Mutiso
analyses	the	country’s	prospects.
	
Somalia	is	an	interesting	place	to	try	and	understand	the	morphing,	and	increasingly	complex	nature	of	war	–	from
the	multiple	actors,	both	state	and	non-state,	to	the	frighteningly	close	horrors	that	filter	through	on	our	ever-
pervasive	digital	screens.	Young	men	and	women	across	the	region,	and	from	as	far	away	as	Minnesota,	in	the
United	States,	have	fallen	victim	to	the	allure	of	fighting	a	‘just	cause’,	and	as	a	result,	countless	families	—	even
those	who	send	their	children	off	to	war	to	fight	such	victims	—	have	themselves	been	victimised.	Yet,	many	parties
have	stood	to	gain,	be	it	monetarily,	or	by	their	new-found	prestige	and	strategic	alignment	with	superior	allies.
But	as	the	conflict	in	Somalia	wanes	or	intensifies	(depending	on	whom	you	ask),	a	mounting	and	unavoidable
danger	lurks.
On	1	July	2018,	celebrations	were	held	in	Somalia	and	across	the	diaspora,	marking	the	58th	anniversary	of	the
country’s	independence.	Two	years	from	now,	as	the	country	marks	its	diamond	jubilee,	the	full	withdrawal	of
AMISOM	from	Somalia	is	scheduled	to	take	place.	Coincidentally,	this	will	also	happen	to	be	the	year	by	which	the
AU	Master	Roadmap	(AUMR)	on	Practical	Steps	to	Silence	the	Guns	in	Africa	by	the	Year	2020	is	expected	to	be
implemented.
A	Kenyan	soldier	examines	the	wreckage	from	an	IED	explosion	in	Somalia
Image	credit:	AMISOM
Currently,	at	the	international	level,	it	is	an	open	secret	that	there	is	growing	disaster	fatigue	regarding	Somalia,
among	other	regions	on	the	precipice	(humanitarian	efforts	are	up,	but	historically	low;	political	efforts	lack	global
leadership).	In	Somalia’s	case,	the	overarching	problem	—	perhaps	dating	back	to	1967/9	–	has	been	the	general
lack	of	legitimacy	of	the	ruling	elite.
Further,	it	will	not	be	lost	on	observers	that	the	fast-approaching	elections	also	scheduled	for	2020,	and	where	the,
as	yet,	unfulfilled	promise	of	‘one-person-one-vote’	is	marked	for	delivery,	presents	a	unique	turning-point	for	the
war-torn	country.	Should	the	ballot	be	once	again	confined	to	a	select	few,	al	Shabaab	and	company	will	only	be
further	vindicated	in	their	claims	to	authority,	no	matter	how	narrowly	defined	these	may	be.
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All	the	same,	should	inclusivity	be	stressed,	the	existing	array	of	political	agendas	might	threaten	to	burst	an	already
fragile	context	into	further	anarchy.	Indeed,	2020	might	present	the	country	with	its	most	difficult	balancing	act	in
decades,	and	it	will	be	the	hurdle	that	really	tests	the	patience	and/or	true	resolve	to	actually	alleviate	the	situation,
on	the	part	of	local	and	external	actors.
One	emerging,	and	stinging	critique	of	the	African	Peace	and	Security	Architecture	(APSA),	is	that	it	is	a	21st	century
tool	of	rentierism	mirroring	the	Cold	War	neopatrimonialism	that	shaped	much	of	Africa’s	recent	destiny.	One
wonders	about	the	veracity	of	the	proclamations	of	help	coming	from	outside,	as	with	the	intentions	of	local	players,
in	their	‘shared	goal’	to	stabilise	Somalia,	as	when	the	long-requested	heavy	machinery	arrive	24	months	to	the	date
of	withdrawal,	in	the	first	case,	or	when	internal	power	struggles	dominate	over	more	pressing	recovery	efforts,	in	the
latter.
In	January,	the	Office	of	the	President	of	Somalia	announced	that	the	State	of	Galmudug	would	also	be	working
closely	with	the	“moderate	Suffi	group”	Al	Sunnah	w’al	Jama’a	(ASWJ)	—	not	a	total	surprise,	seeing	that	as	far	back
as	2009,	religious	groups	had	been	partners	with	the	now	defunct	Transitional	Federal	Government	(TFG)	of
Somalia,	and	quite	perplexingly,	with	the	full	support	of	Ethiopia,	who	had	reportedly	invaded	due	to	militant,	Islamist
rhetoric.	Kenya,	too,	has	not	shied	away	from	the	use	of	shadowy	militias	in	the	securing	of	her	own	interests;	in
Jubaland,	just	across	Kenya’s	border	with	Somalia,	at	least	one	militia	organisation	has	been	given	the	green	light,	in
recent	years,	to	counter	any	other	threats	that	may	pose	a	risk	to	Kenya.	The	Federal	Government	of	Somalia,
however,	is	taking	this	logic	a	notch	higher	by	agreeing	to	integrate	ASWJ,	their	‘moderate’	stance	not	withholding,	in
its	armed	forces.	What	this	portends	for	future	political	settlement(s)	in	the	country	will	not	be	to	the	liking	of	all
parties.
A	case	in	point	is	the	United	States’	indirect	starvation	of	millions	of	Somalis,	when	it	fiercely	stuck	to	Article	4	of	the
USA	PATRIOT	Act,	automatically	cutting	off	aid	to	most	agencies	operating	in	Somalia,	in	2011,	at	the	height	of	the
region’s	worst	drought.	The	mere	suspicion	that	some	food	assistance	would	land	in	the	hands	of	terrorists	fomented
a	policy	of	what	was,	in	effect,	mass	starvation,	as	Alex	de	Waal	and	others	elaborate.	As	non-governmental	actors
and	popularly	elected	governments	have	discovered,	in	accepting	Islamists,	you	are	damned	if	you	do,	and	damned
if	you	don’t.
It	is	hoped	that	the	needed	military	build-up	in	Somalia,	will	not	just	be	another	“castle	in	the
sand”,	a	nuanced	critique	of	pre-civil	war	Somalia’s	military	architecture,	given	by	Ken
Menkhaus
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Somewhat	positively,	external	actors	now	acknowledge	that	Islamist	parties	may	have	“migrated	from	their	absolutist
roots”.	UK’s	DFID	has	traditionally	called	for	“inclusive”	political	settlements.	Closer	to	home,	the	African	Union’s
Livingstone	Formula	–	although	hardly	utilised	—	outlines	the	steps	for	engaging	civil	society	in	reconstruction	and
peace-building.	The	Eastern	African	Intergovernmental	Authority	on	Development	(IGAD)	similarly	adopted	such
inclusive	ideals	at	a	policy	level,	at	least.	The	problem,	as	many	point	out,	is	that	the	Islamists	are	armed.	But	then
again,	who	isn’t	in	Somalia?
The	irony,	then,	in	going	full-circle	to	negotiate	with	non-violent	Islamists,	is	that	the	hawks	would	be	owning	up	to	the
futility	of	the	war.	Should	such	pragmatism	prove	politically	untenable,	then	Somalia	will	be	kept	in	perpetuity	like
Afghanistan,	as	described	by	one	Pakistani	official	—	“the	boiling	pot	that	does	not	boil	over.”
To	be	specific,	one	recent	report	by	the	Counter	Terrorism	Centre	at	West	Point	found	that	a	defeated	al	Shabaab
could	“theoretically	strengthen	[Islamic	State	in	Somalia]	in	the	relative	shadows”.	One	should	not	be	surprised,
therefore,	if	the	former	entity	becomes	the	new	strange	bedfellow	in	the	‘war	on	terror’,	as	the	murderous,	rag-tag
clan	militias	became	US	allies	in	the	fight	to	root	out	the	Islamic	Court’s	Union.
Bryan	Mutiso	is	a	recent	graduate	of	the	MSc	Conflict	Studies	program	at	the	LSE.	He	has	focused	on	issues
surrounding	the	Somali	conflict	for	the	past	several	years,	and	most	recently	contributed	to	the	joint	Development
Responses	to	Displacement	Impact	Project	(DRDIP	Phase	II)	for	IGAD	and	the	World	Bank,	as	part	of	an	external
consulting	team.
	
The	views	expressed	in	this	post	are	those	of	the	author	and	in	no	way	reflect	those	of	the	Africa	at	LSE
blog,	the	Firoz	Lalji	Centre	for	Africa	or	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.
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